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This article presents an original theory for system 
management, based on physics principles. That theory 
considers that risks and opportunity can be seen as 
forces pushing or pulling a system with regards to its 
objective and its KPIs. Based on that proposal, this 
article presents the theory, based on (i) identification of 
susceptibility of systems to internal and external 
characteristics (danger, favorable conditions), thus 
creating forces (risks and opportunities), and (ii) 
evaluation of the sensibility of systems to these forces, 
thus creating consequences (damages or benefits). This 
article also presents the practical vision of that theory 
by detailing the way to observe the force-inducted 
trajectory of the considered system with regards to its 
KPIs. An illustrative example and discussions about 
the perspectives conclude the article. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Managing an organization requires to try to reach 
objectives. These objectives can be of various types but 
mostly they can be represented by KPIs (this is even 
the raison d’être of KPIs). Of course, there may be 
some intangible objectives that couldn’t be represented 
through formal KPIs, but basically, this paper 
considers that the large majority of objectives can be 
assessed with formal KPIs. Consequently, the 
management of an organization is intended to try to 
bring the organization’s KPIs to some predefined 
targeted values. So, schematically, the management of 
any organization aims at controlling the trajectory of 
that organization within the framework of its KPIs. 
The way these KPIs evolve is the consequence of 
changes due to the occurrence of potentialities, which 
then become actualities. Roughly speaking, if the 
consequences of an actuality are positive with regards 
to the targeted KPIs (getting closer), the potentiality is 
an opportunity. Symmetrically, if the consequences are 
getting the organization away from the target values 
for its KPIs, then, the potentiality is a risk. 
The position of this article is to claim that the 
management of an organization requires to identify 
objectives and to deal with decisions to seize or escape 
potentialities (opportunities or risks) in order to reach 
the targeted performance level associated to these 
objectives. Obviously, there are a lot of principles and 
definitions hidden behind this vision, but this article is 
dedicated to try to make them clear by presenting a full 
theory for the control of an organization’s trajectory. 
The question that this article (and the presented theory) 
aims at answering is the following: “how could the 
risks and opportunities related to a considered 
organization be identified, assessed and analyzed to 
illuminate the trajectory of the organization?”  This 
article is organized according to the following 
structure: Section 2 is dedicated to provide an 
overview and an analysis of existing research works 
and scientific contributions that could help to answer 
the previous question. Section 3 describes the physics-
based theory that aims at answering the previously 
defined question. Section 4 presents a didactical 
application of that theory to a crisis management use-
case. Finally, section 5 presents some conclusions and 
perspectives. 
 
2. Related works  
 
Managing potentialities implies to deal with both 
opportunities and risks. As presented in [1], 
opportunities and risks are actually very close and 
symmetric concepts (pulling or pushing the observed 
system with regards to its goals). However, the domain 
of risk management is far more developed and studied 
than the domain of opportunity management. This is 
actually not an issue, especially due to their symmetry. 
Thus this section is mainly focused on contributions 
and results regarding risk management but mostly, 
these can be considered as actual regarding opportunity 
management and more broadly potentialities. 
 





2.1. General statements 
 
There are a few considerations that are nowadays 
generally admitted in the field of risk management. 
First of all, the risk management process is 
generally described according to three or four phases 
(sometimes the fourth phase is omitted) as described in 
[2] and [3]: 
• Risk identification 
• Risk assessment / evaluation 
• Risk mitigation 
• Monitoring of the situation 
Risk identification is dedicated to study the 
organization and its environment in order to detect 
potentialities. Risk assessment (or evaluation) provides 
some tangible values to the risk. Risk mitigation aims 
at limiting the bad consequences of the risk (or 
enhancing the good consequence in the case of an 
opportunity). The monitoring of the situation aims at 
supporting the detection feature making this waterfall 
process a cycle.  
Another generally admitted statement concerns the 
vision of risk. In [4] risk is described as the 
combination of its probability of occurrence on the one 
hand and the impact on the organization on the other 
hand (where the impact can be considered as the 
consequences on the KPIs of the organization). This 
vision can of course be extended to the notion of 
opportunity (with benefit instead of impact) as 
presented in [5] and recall on Figure 1: 
 
 
Figure 1. Two dimensions of potentiality. 
 
It is a very classical two dimensions representation 
of potentiality that is mainly used to visualize and to 
rank risks in the perspective of mitigation actions. 
 
2.2. Risk management technics 
 
There are a lot of well-known and applied risk 
management technics. From the very complete 
literature review of [2], we can cite the following ones: 
• FMEA: Failure Mode and Effects Analysis 
presented in [6]. The principle of FMEA is to 
identify for each component of a system all the 
possible failure modes and their consequences 
on the whole system. These consequences are 
then ranked in a framework similar as the one 
presented on figure 1. 
• FTA (and ETA): Fault Tree Analysis (and 
Event Tree Analysis) presented in [7]. This 
method is based on analysts able to model 
causes (backward with FTA) or effects 
(forward with ETA) of failures as logic 
diagrams, to support decision-making. 
• HAZOP: Hazard and Operational study, 
presented in [8]. It is a brainstorming technics 
based on the use of specific words to introduce 
limits and detect potential risks. It is mainly 
used in chemical domain. 
• CBA (and RBA): Cost Benefit Analysis (and 
Risk Benefit Analysis), presented in [9]. This 
technique is based on compiling a balance 
sheet of benefits versus costs (or risks). 
• SA: Sensitive Analysis, presented in [10]. This 
is a robustness evaluation approach based on 
tracing “what if” questions. 
• Hertz-type simulation: this simulation 
approach can be used to generate a probability 
distribution based on the various combinations 
as presented in [11]. 
• Monte Carlo: As presented in [12], in the 
context of risk management, Monte Carlo can 
be used to reduce the variance of probability. 
• Expert Systems: In the context of risk 
management, expert systems can be used to 
infer causal chains as presented in [13]. 
According to [2], these approaches can be located 
with regards to the phases of risk management process: 
 
Figure 2. Risk management technics versus phases. 
 
Obviously, and from the previous study, the 
mitigation phase is not satisfyingly covered. It is quite 
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a logical statement due to the fact that identification 
and assessment are the phases dedicated to prepare the 
material for decision makers to take their decisions. 
Mitigation has always been considered more like a 
human only activity. 
 
2.3. Contributions from Management Science 
 
Within the domain of Management Science, and 
especially in the field of strategic approaches and tools, 
there are several well-recognized (even if not 
systematically well-appreciated) tools and approaches. 
For instance, Porter’s five forces analysis, SWOT 
Analysis, PEST Analysis, Scenario Planning, Value 
Chain Analysis. In [14] a study of a wide-range of 
public and private organizations in an economic region 
of the UK shows that 70% of these organizations have 
ever used a SWOT analysis, 28% for scenario 
planning, 20% for value chain analysis, 13% for 
Porter’s five forces. 
The SWOT analysis (originated from Harvard 
Business School in the 1950s or 1960s) is the essential 
and indispensable approach to comment. SWOT (or 
SVOR in project management) stands for Strengths, 
Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats (respectively 
Strengths, Vulnerabilities, Opportunities, and Risks). It 
is usually represented as a 2x2 matrix: 
 
Figure 3. SWOT Matrix. 
 
As presented in [15], the SWOT Analysis is mainly 
dedicated to the classification of (i) attributes of the 
considered system (Strengths and Weaknesses) and (ii) 
external potentialities (Opportunities and Threats). 
One interesting aspect of [15] is the comparison of 
the SWOT analysis with TELESCOPIC (an approach 
introduced in the same article) which is very close to 
PEST, except richer. There is a full set of approaches 
similar to PEST (originated from F. Aguilar in the 
1960s at Harvard and successively improved by a 
series of authors such as A. Brown or T. Davenport) 
like STEP, PESTE, PESTEL or the already mentioned 
TELESCOPIC. Basically, all these approaches provide 
a mnemonic for sectors that should be considered as 
sources of risks and opportunities. Basically for 
PESTEL: P (political), E (Economic), S (social), T 
(Technological), E (Environmental), L (Legal). 
 
Figure 4. PESTEL sectors. 
 
One interesting connection between SWOT and 
PESTEL is that the external Opportunities and Threats 
(basically opportunities and risks) could be identified 
by investigating the PESTEL sectors. 
 
2.4. Synthetic vision of potentiality 
 
From the previous related works, potentiality (risk 
or opportunity) has to be considered from the 
dimensions of its probability and of its impact on the 
considered system (cf. 2.1). Besides, there are manual 
tools and approaches for potentialities identification 
(cf. 2.2 and 2.3)  
In addition to the previous considerations, [16] 
describes risk according to three main elements: (i) a 
danger (or driver) that induces the risk, (ii) an event 
that embeds the probability of occurrence, and (iii) the 
consequences representing the actual impact of the 
occurrence of the risk. A very similar structure has 
been used in [17] for the description of a causal danger 
– risk – consequence chain. One very important aspect 
of that causal chain is that it can be generalized, as 
presented in [5], to characteristic (danger or favorable 
condition) – potentiality (risk or opportunity) – 
consequence (damage or benefit). See figure 5: 
 
Figure 5. The potentiality causal chain model. 
 
That model is compatible with the classical vision 
of section 2.1: The probability of a risk is represented 
through the probability of the condition or event to be 
true on Figure 5. The impact of a risk is represented by 
the consequences on figure 5. 
Besides, this model also shows that the approaches 
presented in section 2.2 and 2.3 can be considered as 
methods to identify characteristics and potentialities of 
the model of figure 5. Especially, the methods of 
section 2.2 can be used to identify potentialities that 
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can be distributes in the SWOT matrix, while the 
PESTEL approach can contribute to identify 
characteristic of the considered system and structure 
potentialities in the SWOT Matrix. These consistency 
principles can be described as presented on figure 6: 
 
Figure 6. The potentiality model and existing works. 
 
As a conclusion of this section, the existing 
approaches on risk identification are mainly based on 
literature review, interviews, and other experience-
based methods ([18] and [19]). As a consequence: 
• The classical model for potentiality (impact 
VS. probability) is difficult to use for 
cascading effect and anticipation. 
• No automated, data-driven tool for potentiality 
identification has been identified within the 
previously literature review. 
 
So as an update regarding the initial question 
presented in the introduction “how could the risks and 
opportunities related to a considered organization be 
identified, assessed and analyzed to illuminate the 
trajectory of the organization?” the next section 
presents the envisaged approach. This approach 
focuses on (i) the use of data to continuously model 
potentialities, and (ii) the use of the potentiality models 
to support decision-making in the context of risk and 
opportunity management. 
 
3. A physics-based theory  
 
The objective of this section is to describe a 
potentiality management theory that takes data as input 
and apply physical and mechanical principles to 
continuously provide the human users with outputs that 
support their decision-making processes. 
 
3.1. Data management framework 
 
As it has been discussed in [5] and formally 
described in [20], supporting decision-making can be 
based on climbing the following abstraction levels: (i) 
Data, thanks to perception, (ii) Information, thanks to 
interpretation, and (iii) Decision, thanks to 
exploitation. Besides, this abstraction rising can be 
based on the interaction with knowledge such as 
metamodel or reference base of instance, etc. This 
principle is illustrated on the next figure 7: 
 
Figure 7. Abstraction rising to reach decision. 
 
In the context of this article, the previous 
abstraction framework can be instantiated as follow: 
1. By collecting data (current and forecast) 
related to the observed situation, i.e. the 
considered system and its environment, the 
approach reaches the first DATA level. 
2. By interpreting the collected data with regards 
to a reference metamodel (basically the one 
implicitly represented with figure 5, describing 
the concepts of characteristic, potentialities, 
consequences, etc. and their relations) in order 
to build a situation model, the approach 
reaches the second INFORMATION level. 
3. By using the situation model to perform 
calculation, simulation and other types of 
model exploitation, especially in order to 
evaluate the consequences of the identified 
potentialities (in the situation model), the 
approach reaches the DECISION level. 
In the context of this article, the first step will not 
be described. The following considers that data 
(including actual data and forecasts) can be gathered 
and that this data is significant and trustable. 
Discovery, trust, cleaning of data is out of the scope of 
this article. It absolutely does not mean that these steps 
are obvious, trivial or not relevant (it is quite the 
opposite), but the focus of this article is based on the 
hypothesis that clean and usable data can be collected. 
As a consequence, the following ignores the perception 
stage and focuses on presenting the interpretation and 
exploitation steps.  
 
3.2. Interpretation of Data 
 
The goal of this step is to use the continuously 
collected data to build and maintain a situation model. 
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This model is based on the following metamodel 
(formalizing the vision presented in figure 5): 
 
Figure 8. Potentiality management metamodel. 
 
This metamodel presents both the concepts related 
to the information level and the ones related to the 
decision level. Basically, the objective of the 
information level is to interpret data to instantiate 
concepts of the information package while (one of) the 
objective(s) of the decision level is to use data and the 
model of the information level to infer the instance of 
the decision package. The concepts are: 
• Characteristic: danger or favorable condition. 
• Element: the considered system (or part of it). 
• Potentiality: risk or opportunity for an element. 
• Condition: event that triggers the potentiality 
• Actuality: consequence of the occurrence of a 
potentiality. 
• Action: Act that can impact actualities, 
conditions, characteristics and elements. 
• Decision: choice that triggers an action. 
The question is now: “how do we instantiate the 
concepts of the information package of the metamodel 
based on the available data?”. Basically, the principle 
that is used to answer this question is the following: 
The gathered data is used to fill in a 
multidimensional framework. This framework is based 
on the dimensions that are representative of the 
considered situation: geographical (latitude, longitude, 
altitude), type of system/organization (domain, sectors, 
size), dependency (type of inputs, type of outputs, type 
of energy), status (legal status, social status), and of 
course a lot of others dimensions directly depending on 
the considered domain. The main interest of this 
modeling space (the susceptibility framework) is that 
any characteristic of the observed situation can be 
model as a Boolean value in this susceptibility 
framework. In addition any element can also be located 
in this susceptibility framework (depending on its 
geographical location, its type, its size and more 
generally its values on all dimensions). It actually 
means that for each point in space, the considered 
characteristics affects (1) or not (0) the elements 
located in that point. Let’s take two examples: the 
seismic characteristic of California (characteristic) 
would only impact directly elements of any kind with 
geographical location in California. Similarly, a 
European project of tax reduction for companies of less 
than 250 employees based on the number of 
handicapped employees would only impact directly 
SMEs located in Europe. Of course, it can be a more 
sophisticated function than a Boolean (like a 
distribution between 0 and 1 depending on the strength 
of the impact, or even between -1 and 1). Figure 9 
illustrates that susceptibility framework in a very 
simple case regarding companies based on their size 
and location. 
 
Figure 9. A 3D Susceptibility Framework. 
 
This idea can be represented with the following: 
• An element E can be characterized according 
to the N dimensions of the Susceptibility 
Framework: E = (e1, e2, … en) such as 
longitude, latitude, type, nature, size, type of 
inputs, type of outputs, etc. 
• A characteristic of the environment is a 
Boolean (or a distribution) function of 
occupation in the Susceptibility Framework: 
Ch (x1, x2, … xn) = 1 if the characteristic Ch is 
actually present in the location (x1, x2, … xn). 
Else, Ch (x1, x2, … xn) = 0. 
• The location of E in these N dimensions 
determines its susceptibility to characteristics: 
E is susceptible to all characteristics that have 
a non-null value at the coordinates of E. 
Finally, the principle of the interpretation stage is to 
use incoming data to locate, on the one hand 
characteristics, and on the other hand elements in the 
Susceptibility Framework. Then, based on matching 
location in that framework, the existence of 
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potentialities can be inferred. On a strict point of view, 
this mechanism does allow to automatically instantiate 
potentialities but (i) it does not allow to characterize 
these potentialities (is it a risk or an opportunity? What 
are its probability and impact?), (ii) it does not allow to 
identify its triggering condition(s), and (iii) the 
potentialities only have a possible impact on all the 
elements with the same location. 
So basically, at the end of the Interpretation stage, 
and depending on the available data flow, the situation 
model contains the characteristics, elements and 
potentialities (and their connections) related to the 
observed situation. 
 
3.3. Exploitation of Information 
 
The goal of this step is to use the identified 
potentialities to create a decision support environment. 
Basically, this objective can be summarized as: 
considering the identified potentialities, the goal is to 
infer the associated latent consequences (actualities). 
One of the key idea of this approach is then the 
following: Considering that opportunities and risks are 
potentialities that push or pull the considered system 
with regards to its KPIs (basically a risk would get the 
system away from the target values of its KPIs while 
an opportunity would get it closer), let’s considered 
potentialities as forces in the frameworks of the 
system’s KPIs. 
Consequently, let us introduce a second framework, 
this one dedicated to the exploitation transition 
between information and decision: the Decision 
Framework. The dimensions of this framework are the 
significant KPIs of the considered type of systems. If 
the system is a supply chain, then the dimensions could 
be cost, quality, and time. If the system is a sport team, 
then the dimensions could be offensive performance, 
and defensive performance, etc. 
The objective of this framework is to locate the 
considered system (or elements of the systems) in 
terms of KPI and to define its net of forces (each force 
is actually the representation of the probable 
consequences of each identified potentiality). Then, the 
aim is to define, by summing and combining these 
identified forces, the appropriate combination of 
potentialities to trigger in order to reach the target spot 
of the Decision Framework. This combination of 
potentialities corresponds to a set of decisions and 
actions to take to trigger (or not to trigger) specifically 
the selected potentialities. 
Another benefit is that in addition to seeking for the 
best combination of potentialities to activate in order to 
reach the target zone, this framework can also be used 
to define the target zone itself. By looking at all the 
identified forces and their intensity, one can study the 
available combinations (and especially the ones with 
low cost triggering decisions and actions) to define the 
best compromise between the improvements of the 
KPIs on the one hand and the required effort on the 
other hand. Figure 10 illustrates this principle: 
 
Figure 10. A 3D Decision Framework. 
 
The question now is: “how could the forces be 
defined, considering that the potentialities have been 
identified (thanks to the susceptibility detection 
mechanism) but have not been characterized in terms 
of potential consequences?”. The answer to that 
question is based on the definition of a protocol of 
evaluation of the actual impact of a potentiality. 
More precisely on this impact, these research works 
consider that the potentiality might impact the element 
according to a relative term and an absolute term: the 
relative term depends on the current location of the 
element with regards to its KPIs (e.g. 20% of the profit 
will be lost, in the case of a KPI on the profit) while 
the absolute term does not depend on that location (e.g. 
a net profit of $10,000 whatever the current profit). 
This idea can be represented with the following: 
• If E is susceptible to a characteristic Ch, then 
there is a matrix MCh and a vector VCh that 
represent respectively the relative term and 
the absolute term of the impact of the 
characteristic Ch on E (i.e. the force of the 
potentiality generated by Ch). Then the force 
of Ch on E is: Force = MCh.E+VCh.  
• MCh is a mxm matrix (impact matrix) and VCh 
is a vector (impact vector) of m terms (where 
m is the number of KPIs considered for E). If 
the m KPIs are independent, then MCh is a 




• Each term mi,j represents the specific relative 
impact of Ch on the KPIi due to the value of 
KPIj (if the KPIs are independent, there are 
only mi,i, representing the specific impact of  
Ch on the KPIi due to its current value). Each 
term Vi represents the specific absolute 
impact of Ch on the KPIi. 
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• It is interesting to notice that depending on the 
nature of the considered characteristics, there 
might be profile of matrix and vectors. 
The following question is: “how could the different 
terms of the Matrix MCh and of the Vector VCh be 
defined?”. There may be several avenues related to 
data analytics to answer to that question. The current 
works are based on the notion of micro-consequences 
(µ-consequences) as inputs for a simulation: 
The principle is to define a simulation model of the 
observed system dedicated to evaluate the KPIs of that 
system. The next step is to define (manually or based 
on historic data) the specific µ-consequences of each 
potentiality on the overall situation (a µ-consequence 
could be for instance “between 20% and 30% of the 
delivery trucks will face a 2 to 3 hours delay”). Then, 
the following step is to pass on these µ-consequences 
to the input variables of the simulation model and to 
run the simulation (including the potentially implicit 
stochasticity). The observed KPI as outputs of the 
simulation may be different from the initial ones and 
represent the impact of the considered potentiality 
(actually, of the µ-consequences of that potentiality) to 
the considered system. All µ-consequences are used to 
either assess the actual KPIs value (certain/present) or 
as inputs of the simulation tool to generate the 
associated matrix for the expected forces 
(certain/future) and for the unknown ones (uncertain/ 
future). Figure 11 represents this principle: 
 
Figure 11. From µ-consequences to forces. 
 
One strong hypothesis in that approach concerns 
the supposed independence of characteristics and the 
resulting summability of all the obtained impact Matrix 
and Vectors (just like the forces are supposed to be 
summable). It is clear that in some cases this 
hypothesis is wrong (in such a case, a specific impact 
should be determined for the combination of dependent 
potentialities, resulting in a Matrix and a Vector 
representing the set of µ-consequences associated to 
the combination of potentialities) but in a lot of cases, 
the potentialities are impacting very different aspects 
of the system and can be considered as independent. 
 
3.4. The obtained forces 
 
Basically, the obtained forces, in addition to their 
direction and intensity (within the Decision Framework 
of the KPIs dimensions) are of different natures and 
types. These characteristics may be interesting to 
define patterns of impact matrix and vectors. Figure 12 
represents these natures and types of forces: 
 
Figure 12. Types and natures of forces. 
 
The four different force natures are the following: 
• External field force: the force is due to an 
external characteristic (weather, new law, 
seismic area, etc.). 
• Collaboration force: the force is due to a 
collaboration (a supplier or a customer, sharing 
of a resource, etc.). 
• Internal force: the force is due to some internal 
action (reorganization, buying a resource, etc.). 
• Gravity force: the force is due to some 
unavoidable internal weights (fixed costs, etc.). 
The force types are based on the following criteria: 
• Is the force actual or potential? 
• Is the force positive or negative (is it an 
opportunity or a risk)? 
• Is the force inflicted or managed (is there one 
of our decisions that can trigger it or not)? 
 
4. An illustrative example in the domain of 
crisis management  
 
Nota Bene: The following example is fictional and 
even if the data is realistic, the scenario is not. This 
use-case is dedicated to illustrating the theory. 
The Loire river flooding is one of the three most 
feared disasters in France (with the Seine river 
flooding and the earthquake in south-east of France). In 
1856, such a flood had flooded 110,000 hectares 
occupied today by more than 300,000 people, 13,600 
companies and 72,000 jobs [21]. To enable the 
simulation of such a scenario, the Loire-Cher-Indre and 
Maine-Loire Services of Forecast of Floods (In French 
SPC) did provide a model of propagations: a 100-year 
flood on the Middle Loire, between the Bec d'Allier 
and the Bec de Maine. This is the highest known flood 
event for a given region [22]. This hydro-
meteorological scenario, reported in [21], realistically 
models the water inflow of the six tributaries present in 
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this part of Loire in the case of a 100-year flood. Thus, 
three daily flow and water levels forecast were 
developed for the seven reference hydrometric stations 
and the 11 expected flood days. Each survey contains 
forecast water flows and levels over the next 56 hours 
and three probability levels: high, median and low. In 
the following, the use-case will focus on the city of 
Orleans and on the associated hydrometric station. 
 
4.1. The observed situation 
 
The considered system is the city of Orleans facing 
a river flooding. In this example, two characteristics 
will be considered: (i) the evolution of the behavior of 
the Loire river, and (ii) the rules and doctrine that 
concern such a crisis in a French city. Clearly, in that 
case, the city of Orleans is susceptible to both of them. 
Noticeably, other characteristics could be relevant (e.g. 
the local social climate, the period of the year, etc.) but 
the example will focus on these two. 
 
Figure 13. The Loire River and the area of Orleans. 
 
The considered KPI framework is a 3D framework 
based on the following dimensions: (i) cost, (ii) 
casualties, and (iii) bad image. Obviously, the 
objective of the management is to minimalize the KPIs. 
Considering that the (two) characteristics have been 
identified, this example will focus on the exploitation 
of information (second step). Let’s start the scenario at 
the beginning of the flooding event. 
 
4.2. Exploitation of Information 
 
The data that can be considered as source of µ-
consequences are: (i) the hydrological forecast related 
to the behavior of the Loire river, and (ii) the expected 
consequences of the doctrinal actions (evacuation, 
opening of the dam, opening of the upstream weir, 
etc.). Figure 14 presents the official hydrological 
forecast of water level and water flow in Orleans. The 
simulation is based on a topographic simulation, 
estimating, based on the water levels and flows, the 
submersed surface, the cost of fixing the damages and 
the average casualties. For the consequences of the 
doctrinal actions, this article only considers the 
evacuation. The associated data is the consequences of 
evacuating Orleans (115,000 people), estimated by the 
Local Prefecture (Loiret). The consequences on the 
Bad Image KPI have been manually estimated by the 
communication cell of the Loire prefecture. 
 
 
Figure 14. Water Level/Flow (high, medium, low). 
 
At the very first stage of the crisis, there are factual 
values for the Loire River flow and level, and the only 
potentiality is about the evacuation: the initial obtained 






Figure 15. Initial position and forces. 
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For clarity reason, the scales have been normalized. 
As shown on figure 15, the evacuation force and the 
Loire force are not pushing Orleans in the same way. 
The evacuation force is a potential, managed force 
(cf. figure 12). If the decision of evacuation is not 
taken, Orleans may move in the framework (because of 
the Loire force) and there will be new forces associated 
to that new position (see figure 16). The matrix and 
vectors of that new position are the following: 
• Behavior of the Loire River HIGH: 
 
 
• Behavior of the Loire River MEDIUM: 
 
 






Figure 16. Possible position and forces of Orleans if 
no evacuation decision has been taken. 
 
On figure 16, the light red sphere represents the 
potential position of Orleans, pushed by the Loire force 
only (after one time unit). As a consequence of that 
new position, three potential forces due to the Loire 
River have been calculated (green vectors) that 
represent a strong stream for Orleans in its KPIs 
framework (note that the new vector for the evacuation 
has not been calculated). 
On the contrary if the evacuation decision is taken, 
Orleans may move in the framework (because of the 
evacuation force) and there will be new forces 
associated to that new position (see figure 17). See 
below the associated matrix and vectors: 
 













Figure 17. Possible position and forces of Orleans if 
the evacuation decision has been taken. 
 
On figure 17, the light red sphere represents the 
potential position of Orleans, pushed by the evacuation 
force and the initial Loire force (after one time unit). 
As a consequence of that new position, three potential 
forces due to the Loire River have been calculated 
(green vectors) that represent a far more manageable 
stream for Orleans in its KPIs framework. 
 
5. Conclusion and perspectives  
 
As stated by [23] and [24], instability is the norm. 
There is no rational expectation to maintain any 
organization in a stable state. However, dealing with 
instability is the new perspective of management. The 
theory presented and illustrated in this paper aims at 
offering an innovative vision for such a purpose. By 
describing a path between data and decision, based on 
a physics-based theory, this article claims that it opens 
the door to a brand new vision of management. 
Through that open door, perspectives like “energy 
reasoning” or “solid mechanics” can be seen. The first 
one might be a way to deal (i) with impulsion in 
complement to forces, and (ii) with the valuation of 
options (in terms of costs and energy). The second may 
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be an avenue to deal with the chosen or inflicted 
deformations of an organization (enterprise, supply-
chain, or others) to enhance or adapt the faced forces. 
Of course, there are still a lot to do to turn that 
theory into an actionable and workable practice: the 
trustable and efficient connection with heterogeneous 
data (from all types of sources), the continuous and 
(close to) real-time calculation of trajectories, and the 
visualization. This last aspect of visualization is of the 
greatest importance considering that the diagrams of 
the simple use-case of section 4 are already hard to 
manage (and it is only 3D…). Some research works on 
the usage of Virtual Reality as a support for 
visualization of abstract notions have been initiated.   
 
6. References  
      
[1] R. Olsson, “In Search of Opportunity Management: Is the 
Risk Management Process Enough?”, International Journal 
of Project Management, 25(8), pp. 745-752, 2007. 
 
[2] D. White “Application of systems thinking to risk 
management: a review of the literature”, Management 
Decision, 1995, 33(10), pp.35-45, 
 
[3] W. Ho, T. Zheng, H. Yildiz, and S. Talluri, “Supply chain 
risk management: a literature review”, International Journal 
of Production Research, Taylor&Francis, 2015, 53(16), pp. 
5031-5069. 
 
[4] P. J. Edwards, P. A. and Bowen, Risk management in 
project organisations, Elsevier, Oxford, UK, 2005. 
 
[5] F. Benaben, B. Montreuil, J. Gou, J. Li, M. Lauras, I. 
Koura, W. Mu, “A tentative framework for risk and 
opportunity detection in a collaborative environment based 
on data interpretation” Proceedings of 52nd HICSS’19, 2019, 
Hawaii, USA. 
 
[6] J.J Clifton, “Hazard prediction”, in Keller, A.Z. and 
Wilson, H.C. (Eds), Disaster Prevention, Planning and 
Limitation, Disaster Prevention and Limitation Unit, 
University of Bradford and The British Library, 1990. 
 
[7] T. Bell, “Managing risk in large complex systems –
special report”, Spectrum, June 1989. 
 
[8] E.C. Hambly, and E.A. Hambly, “Risk evaluation and 
realism, proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers”, 
Civil Engineering, 102(2), pp. 64-71, 1994. 
 
[9] L.B. Lave, “Approaches to risk management: a critique”, 
Risk Evaluation and Management, Plenum Press, New York, 
NY, 1986. 
 
[10] V.T. Covello, “Decision analysis and risk management 
decision making: issues and methods”, Risk Analysis, 7(2), 
pp. 131-139, 1987. 
 
[11] S.S.M. Ho, and R.H. Pike, “The use of risk analysis 
techniques in capital investment appraisal”, in Ansell, J. and 
Wharton, F. (Eds), Risk: Analysis, Assessment and 
Management, John Wiley & Sons, Chichester, 1992. 
 
[12] V.T. Covello, and M.W. Merkhofer, “Risk Assessment 
Methods – Approaches for Assessing Health and 
Environmental Risks”, Plenum Press, New York, NY, 
 
[13] T.A. Kletz, “Critical Aspects of Safety and Loss 
Prevention”, Butterworths, London, 1990. 
 
[14] R. Gunn, and W. Williams, W. “Strategic tools: an 
empirical investigation into strategy in practice in the UK”. 
Strategic Change, 16(5), pp. 201-216, 2007. 
 
[15] G. Panagiotou, “Bringing SWOT into focus” Business 
strategy review, 14(2), pp. 8-10, 2003. 
 
[16] B. Zeng, P. C. Yen, “Rethinking the role of partnerships 
in global supply chains: a risk-based perspective”, 
International Journal of Production Economics, 185, pp. 52-
62, 2017. 
 
[17] F. Benaben, A.-M. Barthe-Delanoë, M. Lauras, S.  
Truptil, “Collaborative Systems in Crisis Management: A 
Proposal for a Conceptual Framework”, Proceedings of Pro-
VE’14, Springer, IFIP, Amsterdam, Netherlands, 434, pp. 
396-405, 2014. 
 
[18] C. Fang, F. Marle, E. Zio, J. C. Bocquet, “Network 
theory-based analysis of risk interactions in large engineering 
projects”, Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 106(2), 
pp. 1-10, 2012. 
 
[19] X. Zhang, Y. Yang, J. Su, “Risk identification and 
evaluation of customer collaboration in product 
development”, Journal of Industrial Engineering and 
Management, 8(3), pp. 928-942, 2015. 
 
[20] F. Benaben, M. Lauras, A. Fertier, N. Salatge, 
“Integrating model-driven engineering as the next challenge 
for artificial intelligence – Application to risk and crisis 
management”, Proceedings of the 2019 Winter Simulation 
Conference, Washington, 2019. 
 
[21] H. Dolidon, “Description of the Loire River Flooding” 
Deliverable of the French funded project SANCTUM, 2019. 
 
[22] French Ministry of Ecology and Sustainable 
Development. “Les inondations”. Technical report, 2004. 
 
[23] N. Taleb, The Black Swan – The Impact of the Highly 
Improbable. Random House, New York, 2007. 
 
[24] J. P. Ribeiro, A. Barbosa-Povoa, “Supply Chain 
Resilience: Definitions and quantitative modelling 
approaches–A literature review”, Computers & Indus. 
Engineer., vol. 115, pp. 109-122, 2018. 
 
Page 2196
